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CONTRACTUAL DIFFICULTIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT AND THE PROTECTION OF BIODIVERSITY:
THE CASE OF CONSERVATION AND MITIGATION BANKING
Abstract: This paper offers a principal-agent model of feasible private contracting
in mitigation and conservation banking aimed at the protection of natural habitat
and bio-diversity of US wetlands and uplands. It is shown that while it is
straightforward to design an incentive contract, such a contract may not achieve
the federally mandated objective of no net loss of habitat. This is because the
minimum payment required as an economic incentive to private agents may be
greater than what they should receive for the habitat values that they actually
created in the field. This possible problem is shown to derive from nonconvexity
in the production possibility set between the biological value of land as natural
habitat and in non-habitat uses such as in urban development. The paper
concludes with a consideration of several institutional devises that may promote
the convergence of private contracting and the attainment of no net loss. These
include the payment of subsidies, greater accuracy in the identification of actual
quality by the principal, and the use of several incentive alignment devises.
___________________

Mitigation and conservation banking are institutional initiatives aimed at, respectively,
wetland and upland environmental management with the objectives of promoting
environmental sustainability and biodiversity of natural habitats. However, mitigation
and conservation banking is sometimes criticized for failing in these objectives, rather,
causing the over-development by property developers of natural habitats without
adequate replacement by reconstructed habitat from derelict land.1 This paper
investigates certain aspects of this too frequent failure from the perspective of a principalagent asymmetric information model.

1

By 'derelict land' is meant land currently offering low biological and nonbiological values. Such land
includes abandoned industrial land, lands taken over by invasive species, or areas of wetland or upland cut
off from an integrated productive environment by linear developments such as roads, bridges and railways.
2

The requirement to mitigate damage to natural habitats is governed by several federal
statutes and regulations.2 Thus, when a developer is required to mitigate the impact of
property development on natural habitats it may do so itself - either on-site or off-site.
However, as a property developer is unlikely to be a specialist in mitigation, its costs may
be higher than when a specialist in habitat reconstruction performs mitigation.3 Thus, the
development of private mitigation and conservation banking over the last twenty years or
so is a response to cost differences between developers and bankers - with a consequent
social surplus derived from trading in mitigation credits and the equation of marginal
costs of mitigation. As such, the social value of mitigation and conservation banking is
derived in much the same way as many other private institutions trading in pollution
permits of various types: viz.: the equation of the marginal costs of abatement between
polluters.4

The institutional details of mitigation and conservation banking are described inter alia in
Bonnie (1999), Castelle et al. (1992), Federal Register (1995), Sheahan (2001), Wheeler
and Strock (1995) and Weems and Canter (1995). Our focus is on the award of mitigation
credits by a regulatory agency (the Army Corp or Engineers or the US Fish and Wildlife

2

The relevant legislation is contained in section 404 of the Clean Water Act, section 10 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act and in the wetland conservation provisions of the Food Security Act. The practice of
mitigation banking is systematized in the Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of
Mitigation Banks (1995) issued under the signatures of five assistant secretaries in the Departments of
Agriculture, Interior and Commerce, the Army and the Environmental Protection Agency. Conservation
banking is promoted under the Endangered Species Act and is operated by the US Fish and Wildlife
Service.
3
Sheahan (2001, page 22) offers evidence on the high failure rate of on-site mitigation by non-specialists.
4
While US laws require the mitigation of impacts, the growth of private (or, 'entrepreneurial') mitigation
and conservation banking developed without legislation of details (Sheahan, 2001). Relevant details
developed 'on the go' that are important here include the definition of the 'commodity' unit traded as
mitigation 'credits', the exact moment when these credits are to be awarded to a mitigation or conservation
bank for habitat restoration, and how 'quality' is to be measured and compared between a natural habitat
that is being destroyed and a reconstructed habitat for which it mitigates.
3

Service), hereafter 'the principal', to a mitigation or conservation bank, hereafter 'the
agent', for the physical restoration work that it has performed on a particular site.

Several important points about mitigation or conservation credits should be emphasized
at the outset. First, the number of credits awarded by the principal is supposed to reflect
the quality of reconstructed habitat in comparison with natural habitat. The mitigation
replacement ratio would be 1:1 if the quality of reconstructed habitat matched that of the
natural habitat it was replacing. The use of an appropriately calculated mitigation
replacement ratio is crucial under the Federal Guidance (1995) policy of no net loss of
habitat. Awarding too many credits for low quality reconstructed habitat would thwart
this objective.5 Secondly, investment in the restoration of otherwise derelict land into
sustainable-quality restored habitat requires costly investment. As agents have a good
degree of control over the level of these expenditures the quality of a reconstructed
habitat is a choice variable.6 Thirdly, the sustainable-quality of restored habitat soon after
restoration is difficult even for teams of experts employed by the principal to observe.
The reason why seemingly premature judgments of quality are made by principals is so
that the agent can obtain a return on its investment through the award of credits in a
5

Principals are aware of this issue: in California replacement ratios vary from 1:1 to 4:1, in Maine 1:1 to
8:1, and in New Jersey 1:1 to 7:1 (Castelle et al, 1992). A 4:1 ratio means that four credits in a bank are
required to substitute for one credit of natural habitat. The reason for a ratio greater than unity is the
perceived lower quality of reconstructed habitat. The mitigation ratio would be less than unity when
reconstructed habitat is of better quality than destroyed natural habitat. Typically this can occur when
mitigation is of several small, isolated, natural habitats that are consolidated into a large mitigation tract.
Since failure of mitigation banking to achieve no net loss is frequently stated, the emphasis of this paper is
on situations where the mitigation ratio is greater than unity. However, the consolidation benefit of
mitigation banking should not be ignored in a wider assessment of the institution.
6
. That quality is a choice variable is implied in the following statement by three biologists: "There is no
recipe for restoration that will work at all sites. The success of tidal marsh restoration efforts depends
heavily on the extent to which the designer understands the site and the materials being utilized during
construction. Projects need well-defined objectives and attention paid to detail. Site morphology, substrate
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timely manner. These are later sold to companies that are destroying a natural habitat
that, under permit, are required to mitigate damages.7

The success of mitigation for destroyed natural habitat has been questioned. In an
extensive review Castelle et al (1992) found that "follow-up studies indicate that the
average rate of compliance with permit conditions was 50%. Common problems include
inadequate design; failure to implement the design; lack of proper supervision; site
infestation by exotic species; grazing by geese or other animals; destruction by floods,
erosion, fires, or other catastrophic events; failure to adequately maintain water levels;
and failure to protect projects from on-site and off-site impacts such as sediments, toxics,
and off-road vehicles" (Castelle et al, 1992, page i). Moreover, Harrison (1995) points
out that mitigation banks often put little effort into reconstruction projects, and Kukoy
and Canter (1995) assert that non-compliance with Section 404 permit requirements was
quite widespread.

While there may be several explanations for quality failures, the focus here is on the
existence of asymmetric information between principals and agents. As it is an agent that
works on a daily basis reconstructing a habitat, it will be more familiar than the principal
with key characteristics of a site - such as the condition of the many determinants of its
hydrology that are critical in the health of reconstructed wetlands (e.g. Montalto et al,

transmissivity, and porosity all have the potential to make or break a project, and should therefore be
considered carefully in design development" (Montalto, Steenhuis and Parlange, 2002, page 46).
7
The profitability of mitigation banking is not generally known. However, it has been estimated that the
cost of wetland restoration varies between $25,000 and $130,000 per acre while credits have sold for as
much as $250,000 per acre in New Jersey (The Economist, August 10th, 2000).
5

2002). It is the agent, therefore, that has the clearest idea of what types and levels of
expenditure are actually needed to reconstruct a sustainable high quality habitat.

Although we are assuming asymmetric information consider for a moment the situation
of fully symmetric information. At the point in time of the award of credits, based on its
observation of the quality of the finished 'product', the principal awards either a high or
low number of credits to the agent, respectively, F* and R*. If it sees high quality, QH, it
awards the full number of credits, F*. If it sees low quality, QL, it awards a reduced
number of credits, R*. Alternatively, with full information, the principal could base its
award on an observation of the level of investment by the agent. Schematically,
CN gives QH and is awarded with F*
CS gives QL and is awarded with R*
where CN is the high 'no shirking' level of investment by the agent and CS is the lower
'shirking' level of investment. However, sustainable quality is not observable until many
years after the time of the credit-award. The agent knows this and therefore has an
opportunity to fool the principal. The agent can benefit by incurring only low costs for
the possible award of the high number of credits.

The award of credits is actually made on the basis of two other observations by the
principal - of the agent's actual spending on habitat reconstruction, C, and on a premature
observation of sustainable-quality, Q. Thus,
C gives Q which in the long-run yields QH or QL

6

Accordingly, the principal's observation of Q does not entirely discriminate between QH
and QL. Nor is observation of actual investment in habitat reconstruction, C, a perfect
predictor of QH or QL. Thus, the principal does not know whether CN or CS was invested even though it observes C - and so cannot use CN and CS as proxies for QH or QL.

Since the principal faces a problem of asymmetric information it draws up an incentive
contract with the agent awarding F* or R* credits on the basis of its (imperfect)
observation of quality. The full number of credits, F*, is awarded for reconstructed
habitat that is judged to be of equal biological value to that of natural habitat of equal
acreage. The lower level of credits, R*, is awarded if lower quality is (imperfectly)
observed.

Having defined the principal-agent problem of interest, the rest of this paper proceeds as
follows. Section 2, defines the contractually feasible set of F* and R* that will both
induce an agent to participate in mitigation or conservation banking and give it the
incentive to choose the high level of investment that produces the high sustainablequality reconstructed habitat. However, it is argued in section 3 that such a contract may
not attain the federally mandated aim of no net loss of natural habitat because of
objective conditions in the field. As is explained below, these have to do with
nonconvexity in the production possibility set between the value of a tract of land as
undisturbed natural habitat and in its best non-habitat uses. Section 4 discusses various
reliefs to problems of private contracting in habitat restoration. Conclusions are drawn in
section 5.

7

2: Feasible contracts
A mitigation bank's net payoff measured in credits awarded by the principal for
developing a given tract of reconstructed wetland depends on the number of credits
awarded less the cost of creating those credits. A mitigation bank can try to maximize the
option value of a tract assuming that quality is perfectly observable by the principal (as in
the model of Fernandez and Karp, 1998). Alternatively, because it is in fact difficult for
the principal to measure quality, the agent might reduce the level of investment in
quality-enhancement so lowering its costs, hoping that the principal will not notice the
lower quality. This is a classic principal-agent problem that derives from the difficulty of
the principal observing true quality.

A mitigation bank's expected payoff from "shirking" on the level of investment, E(ΠS),
measured in credits is:
E(ΠS) = pF + (1 - p)R - CS

(1)

where p is the probability of low-quality not being detected when quality is in fact low, F
is the full number of credits awarded for high quality, (1 - p) is the probability of low
quality being detected by the principal, R is the reduced number of credits awarded for
lower quality, and CS is the cost of investing in the tract (again measured in credits) 8
when the low level of effort is applied by a mitigation bank.

The level of CS is determined by a minimum set of "gardening" inputs that the agent
reasons must be seen to be done, even though it may know that expenditure at the high
8

The cost of investment in a tract measured in credits is simply the dollar cost divided by market price of a
credit.
8

level CN is really necessary to achieve QH. Furthermore, it is assumed that CS ≥ CM where
CM is the minimum level of investment determined by the principal and stated (either
explicitly or implicitly) in the contract.9

The expected payoff from not shirking, E(ΠN), is:
E(ΠN) = (1 - q)F + qR - CN

(2)

where q is the probability of high quality not being detected when in fact quality is high,
and CN is the cost of creating high quality reconstructed habitat, CN > CS. If the principal
wants the agent to invest in high quality it must set E(ΠN) = U, where U is the return on
comparable investments outside of mitigation banking. This is the participation
constraint.

The, incentive compatibility condition, whereby the mitigation bank chooses to invest in
high quality is E(ΠN) ≥ E(ΠS). Or,
(1 - q)F + qR - CN ≥ pF + (1 - p)R - CS

(3)

This rearranges to:
F-R≥

CN − CS
1 − ( p + q)

(4)

That is, the difference in credits awarded in the contract for high and low quality
reconstructed habitat, F - R, must be equal to or greater than the (mistake) adjusted
difference in costs. Notice that the larger is the propensity to make mistakes - measured
by p + q, the greater must be the contractual difference between F and R. If this
9

In practice the agent may require the agent to increase expenditure on inputs are work progresses. Hey
and Philippi (1999) have a good description of this in the case of wetland mitigation in the Florida Keys.
9

inequality is reversed the agent has an incentive not to invest in high quality
reconstruction.

Further insights can be gained by graphing the participation and incentive compatibility
constraints. The participation constraint assuming competitive conditions is derived from
equation (2)
E(ΠN) = (1 - q)F + qR = U + CN

(5)

where
U = CNK

(6)

and K is the rate of return on capital in a comparable risk class outside of mitigation
banking.

On rearrangement the participation constraint is:
F=

U + CN
q
R
−
(1 − q) 1 − q

(7)

This is graphed in figure 1.

The incentive compatibility constraint once again is E(ΠN) ≥ E(ΠS), which on
rearrangement of equation (3), and again assuming competitive conditions, becomes:
F=

CN − CS
+R
1 − ( p + q)

(8)

where the first term on the right-hand side is a constant. The incentive compatibility
constraint is also drawn in figure 1.

10

Both constraints are simultaneously fulfilled in the area on or above the heavy lines
drawn in figure 1. If the contract between the principal and the agent states that F and R
falls in this area for, respectively, high and low quality, the agent will want both to
participate and to aim to produce high quality reconstructed habitat.10

3: Objective constraints in nature

A crucial issue is whether the combination F* R* offered in a contract is necessarily
consistent with the policy of no net loss. An important consideration here is how many
credits, R, are actually created with the low-expenditure level, CS, as an objective fact?
More particularly, we are interested in the objective constraint (F*R) so that it can be
compared with the contractual constraint (F*R*). As is shown below, a private contract
may not be consistent with the policy of no net loss.

According to the opinion of experts, the biological value of a contiguous tract of land in
many habitat functions increase rapidly as the area of land under consideration increases
in size.11 The implication of this observation is that the production possibility set on
contiguous land between its biological use as natural habitat and other uses - such as in
urban development - is nonconvex. Such possible non-convexity is implied in, for

10

If the principal was a profit maximizer and competitive conditions were assumed, all the principal needs
to offer the agent is the combination F*R*. However, the assumption is that the principal aims for no net
loss project by project. In this case any contract in the area above the heavy lines should suit the principal.
11
Wetland habitat and biotic valuation by experts can use the Delphi method of scoring the many
characteristics of a wetland on a scale of 0 to 1 and then combining the individual scores into a weighted
average quality index. Mitsch and Gosselink (2000, pages 591-96) point out. that several quality
assessment methods exist including the Habitat Evaluation Procedure used by the US Fish and Wildlife
Service, the Wetland Evaluation Technique used for a time by the US Army Corps of Engineers, and the
recently developed hydrogeomorphic classification. These authors also observe that economic valuation of
wetlands depends, inter alia, on the correct identification of habitat, biotic and other physical
characteristics.
11

example, NRC (1992) that suggests that habitat and species diversity on wetland
increases disproportionately with wetland acreage. In addition, federal government
agencies recognize the ecological advantage of large over small acreages of restored
wetlands (Federal Register, 1995). Thus, "it may be more advantageous for maintaining
the integrity of the aquatic ecosystem to consolidate compensatory mitigation into a
single large parcel or contiguous parcels when ecologically appropriate" (page 58,605).
The implication is that the ecological value of a single large habitat acreage is more than
n times the value of n separate acreages each 1/nth the size.12

Figure 2 shows a production possibility set on a given acreage W1, of natural habitat.
Initially all of this acreage is natural habitat with a biological value of OA.13 However, as
acres are sequentially moved over to non-habitat uses the value of the acreage as natural
habitat falls rapidly.

The nonconvexity in the production possibility set of figure 2 is reflected in figure 3.
Thus, the marginal cost in terms of lost biological or economic value of sequentially
converting a natural habitat property of W1 acres to another use falls as the amount of it
withdrawn from natural habitat rises. Hence, the total cost function in the upper part of
the figure is convex.

12

At the theoretical level Baumol and Bradford (1972) and Helfand and Rubin (1994) argue that if
technical external diseconomies from one good onto the other are strong enough, the production possibility
set will be nonconvex. For example, it could be that building only a few houses on a tract of natural habitat
destroys the remainder as, say, a bird nesting habitat. The declining (in absolute value) slope of the
production possibility frontier in figure 2 indicates that the marginal social cost of residential use is falling.
13
Proportionality between biological and economic values is assumed.
12

Nonconvexity in the production sets between natural habitat and non-habitat uses also
implies that the marginal benefit of moving contiguous derelict land into natural habitat
uses rises as the amount of land sequentially moved over increases. Hence, the total
benefit function (TBCN) in the lower part of figure 3 increases at an increasing rate. For
example, the second one-acre of created wetland has a greater biological value than the
first one-acre when it is added to the first one-acre, the third acre more the second
(making three acres), and so on. While there must be some limit to this process, it is
assumed that the amount of derelict land at some locality available for moving over into
mitigation acreage is not at this limit. In fact, it is assumed that there is a maximum of W1
acres of derelict land available.14

Figure 3 indicates that if W1 units of existing natural habitat is moved to other uses, the
total cost in terms of lost natural habitat biological services is OA. However, assuming
quality equivalence (i.e., the high quality commensurate with expenditure CN), if W1
acres of derelict land is turned into reconstructed habitat an equivalent value, 0B, is
created. Equally, assuming for simplicity that one-acre is worth one credit, then W1 acres
of reconstructed habitat is worth F* credits.

However, what is the equivalency - measured in credits - when low quality reconstructed
habitat (commensurate with the low level of expenditure CS) is used to replace high
valued natural habitat?

14

These assumptions about the productivity of converted land imply that the acreage of contiguous land in
a conservation or mitigation bank should be as large as possible. This is consistent with expert opinion

13

In figure 4 the total benefit function TBCs is closer to the x-axis than is TBCN because of
the lower level of expenditure by the agent.15 In this case, the objective of no net loss
implies that more than W1 acres of reconstructed habitat are needed to offset the loss of
W1 acres of natural habitat. In fact, W2 acres of newly created habitat balance W1 acres of
lost natural habitat.

Alternatively, if W1 acres are all that is available in a particular mitigation or
conservation bank, that bank can compensate for only W3 lost acres of natural habitat.
That is, the value of the reconstructed habitat (W1C) is equal to the value of only W3
acres (= R credits) of natural habitat lost (where W1C = W3D).

Notice that in this case - where the value of created habitat is less than the value of
natural habitat - there is a large disparity in the compensation ratio. In figure 4 inspection
shows that this is about 8 acres of created habitat substituting for only one acre of natural
habitat. Equivalently, each acre of reconstructed habitat is worth only 1/8th of a credit.
Thus, from figure 4, the objective payoffs for high quality and low quality reconstructed
habitat are determined as, respectively, F* and R.

There remains the issue of the comparison between the objective and contractual payoff
ratios. It will be recalled that the combination F*R* simultaneously fulfills the
participation and incentive alignment constraints. However, as has just been

cited earlier
15
If reconstructed habitat is inherently less productive than natural habitat - which could well be the case in
the field - the TB functions will be even closer to the x-axis. This will worsen the problems discussed
below.
14

demonstrated, the objective tradeoff is the combination F*R. It may turn out that F*R
does not simultaneously fulfill the two constraints. In which case either private
contracting is not possible, or, the objective of no net loss will be frustrated.

Thus, suppose that CS has to be large in order to produce even low quality habitat on a
tract of unpromising derelict land. But that nonconvexity in the production possibility set
is so severe that such low quality replaces very little natural habitat. That is, CS produces
R, but R < R* (where R* is the lowest acceptable payment given the agent's cost
conditions CN and CS).

The objective equilibrium might fall in any of the four areas marked G, H, I, J in figure 1.
Whether the conditions for the simultaneous fulfillment of private contracting and no net
loss are fulfilled are described in table 1.
TABLE 1: THE OBJECTIVE CONSTRAINT(F*R) AND
THE FEASIBILITY OF PRIVATE CONTRACTING

Area in Incentive
compatibility
figure
1
G
Yes
H
No
I
No
J
Yes

Participation
constraint
fulfilled
Yes
Yes
No
No

Private contract
consistent with
no net loss
Yes
No
No
No

As can be seen in table 1 only if F*R lies in area G (including on the heavy lines) is a
private contract consistent with no net loss. In all other areas a private contract offering
F*R is not consistent with no net loss. Thus, in area H the incentive compatibility
constraint is not fulfilled and the agent chooses the low level of expenditure on inputs,
CS, with resulting low quality. As a result R < F* - where R is the return to the low level
15

of investment and F* is the loss on the associated destroyed natural habitat.16 In areas I
and J the participation constraint is not fulfilled and an agent offered F*R would choose
not to participate in a private contractual relationship.

Looked at differently, suppose that the principal offers the contract F*R* no matter what
- so ensuring that the agent participates. Unfortunately the incentive compatibility
constraint is not met in areas H and I so the agent will deliver only R. In area J the agent
has incentive compatibility so would try to supply F*. However, as the participation
constraint is not fulfilled, private contracting is frustrated.

4: Institutional supports

The foregoing discussion indicates that private sector mitigation and conservation
banking are not necessarily viable institutions under certain biological conditions in the
field. In particular, strong nonconvexity in the production possibility set between the
value of a tract of natural habitat in this use and in nonhabitat uses militates against
private contracting achieving no net loss.

However, this is not the end of the story as certain steps may be taken to improve the
prospects of successful private mitigation and conservation banking.

First, looking back to table 1, in area J the alignment of the objective payoffs F* and R is
such that if a private contract offered F*R* incentive compatibility would be achieved.
16

Without incentive compatibly the agent will supply R which with a nonconvex production possibility set
can never be large enough to equal F*.

16

The agent would strive to supply sustainable high quality reconstructed habitat. The
problem is that this will not happen because the agent will not want to participate.
However the participation constraint might be fulfilled on the payment of the subsidy to
the agent. Thus, equation 7 becomes:

F=

U + CN − S
q
R
−
(1 − q)
1− q

(7a)

where S is the subsidy. The effect of the subsidy is to shift the participation constraint
towards the x-axis, so shrinking area J - where private contracting is not feasible, and
increasing area G where it is feasible.

Secondly the area of feasible contracting can be increased by reducing the size of p and q
- where it will be recalled, p is the probability of the principal mistaking low quality for
high quality, and q is the probability of mistaking high quality for low quality. Lower p
and q move both the participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint,
respectively equations (7) and (8), closer to the x-axis in figure 1. The result is that the
area of feasible contracting, G, is enlarged at the expense of the other areas.

Two factors that can aid a principal in reducing its propensity to make mistakes (p + q)
are closer monitoring and better science. Closer monitoring of agents' investments in
habitat reconstruction should help in reducing mistakes. For example, closer monitoring
can help a principal discriminate between knowing whether a particular investment has
been executed and when it has been executed well.

17

Improved scientific knowledge of the practice of habitat reconstruction should also better
inform the principal in its judgement of the link between investment by the agent and
ultimate impact on sustainable quality. For example, improved scientific knowledge may
help to discriminate between those 'gardening techniques" that work well and those that
don't.17

Another factor that can improve the efficacy of private mitigation and conservation
banking if when the agent wishes to create a good reputation for turning out high quality
reconstructed habitat. Our earlier discussion was implicitly constructed as a one off game
between the principal and the agent. However, in a repeated game the incentive for the
agent to supply low quality, QL, with low investment, CS, is likely to be reduced.

Still other devices have been suggested to achieve incentive alignment - including the
posting of bonds by agents, and the sequencing of credit awards over a longer timeframe.
These too may work to achieve incentive alignment, but it is worth mentioning, by
raising agent's costs such devises may breach the participation constraint.

5: Conclusions

This paper discusses contractual difficulties in private sector contracting for habitat
replacement aimed at creating sustainable habitat and bio-diversity. The paper describes
the nature of the principal-agent problem as stemming from two sources. First, a

18

principal's inability to discriminate between high or low effort as applied by the agent,
and, secondly, its inability to observe the exact quality of reconstructed habitat at the time
of payment (where payment is in the form of the award of credits that the agent can later
sell).

Moreover, it is argued that the existence of asymmetric information is not an insufferable
problem as it is feasible to design an incentive contract between the principal and the
agent that could achieve the stated Federal policy of no net loss of habitat - whereby
natural habitat destroyed is balanced by restored habitat on otherwise derelict land.

However, it is argued that the private contracting of habitat restoration to mitigation or
conservation banks using incentive contracts may not achieve no net loss because it is not
possible to write an appropriate contract. The root of this problem lies with nonconvexity
in the production possibility sets between the value of land in biological uses as natural
habitat and in non-habitat uses such as urban development. It can be that the difference in
biological value created on reconstructed habitat and that on destroyed on natural habitat
is so great that an incentive contract cannot be written so as to fulfill the participation
constraint given an agent's minimum investment costs.

The paper concludes with some suggestions for improving the effectiveness of private
contracting in the maintenance of the scale and diversity of habitat under the no net loss
objective. These include the use of subsidies, greater accuracy in the judgment of quality
17

Hey and Philippi (1999) describe trial and error in ascertaining the best way to restore seagrass beds.
Initial replanting by scuba divers largely failed, and it was discovered that what really mattered was the

19

of reconstructed habitat on the part of the principal, and the use of devises such as the
posting of bonds and the sequencing of credit 'payments' as actual quality becomes
observable.

creation of appropriate subsea conditions in which the grasses would repopulate themselves.
20

Figure 1: Feasible contracts
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Figure 2 : A nonconvex production set between natural habitat and non-natural
habitat biological values on a given acreage of land
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Figure 3 : No Net Loss of Habitat Services.
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Figure 4: Created habitat less productive than natural habitat
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